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1. Introduction
As someone who has been heavily influenced by the informal logic movement and as a former
advisee of J. Anthony Blair at the University of Windsor, the author is delighted that Dr.
Federico Puppo has made a case for a “Canadian school” of informal logic and argumentation.
However, the author’s personal reaction is one thing, and the existence of such a school is
another. Argumentation scholars have to be careful not to buy into a thesis without thinking
through support of it, particularly if we are to consider and present ourselves as good at
reasoning and arguing.
In his OSSA 12 article, Puppo attempts to discharge his dialectical obligation by
responding to Blair’s (2019) confession that he is unable “to recognize anything distinctively
Canadian about our [John Woods and Douglas Walton, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Michael
Gilbert, and Ralph Johnson and Blair’s] contributions” to the emergence of argumentation as a
field of scholarly inquiry (p. 59). As someone who has written extensively on the history of the
informal logic movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Konishi 2009, 2011, 2016, 2016, 2019), the
author would like to focus on the early days of the movement and bring up some relevant issues
based on my own research. Because of limited access to materials from the mid-1990s until now
on which to base comments, that period is necessarily outside the scope of this paper. Some of
my comments will add another layer to address the “Canadian” component of Puppo’s Canadianschool-of argumentation thesis. Other comments will focus on the “school of thought”
component. Section two briefly offers the gist of his article as a starting point for my response.
Section three focuses on the notion of a “Canadian school” with reference to my oral history
interview with Govier and Blair and Johnson’s published and unpublished documents. Section
four focuses on the notion of “school of thought” and offers several thoughts on “an unbroken
intellectual tradition” in the history of informal logic and argumentation (Jaspers, 1949/1959, qtd
in Puppo 2020, p. 13)1. Section five concludes the author’s response. Throughout this response,
the author would like to modify Jürgen Habermas’ notion of public sphere and examine the
informal logic movement, highlighting the media function of Blair and Ralph H. Johnson as well
as the relationship between the history and the theory of informal logic and argumentation
(Konishi 2009, p. 22).
Although Puppo (2020) refers to the Megarian school as a third sense of the term “school” in his article—
specifically, a group of philosophers under the same appellation (pp. 14-16), the author will group Jaspers’ sense of
school of thought and the Megarian school together but focus more on Jasper’s sense because of possible
distinctions and overlap between them. Another reason to group these two senses together but focus primarily on
Jaspers’ is that the line of support that Puppo (2020) introduces in his OSSA article is a new one, distinct from his
introduction to Informal Logic: A ‘Canadian’ Approach to Argument.
1
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2. “Canadian” and “school” as key terms in Puppo’s article
In an attempt to make a case against Blair’s question on the existence of distinct Canadian
contributions to the birth and rise of argumentation, Puppo (2020) turns his attention to John
Woods, who uses such phrases as “Canadian influence on theories of argument” and the
“Windsor approach to formal logic.” Accepting Woods’ position, Puppo (2020) states that:
it seems possible to affirm sufficient clues to sustain the idea that there is, fundamentally, a
certain tradition of thought or approach among the ‘Canadians’: that of informal logic and
of the analytical approach to philosophy, with a particular way of looking at argumentation
and reasoning, and a geographical context which spurred them to share—and often to
debate—their respective points of view. This is not to say that only Canadian scholars have
developed the informal logic orientation or that only Canadians are involved in its study:
but it does seem that this tradition exists and that it was born and was developed in Canada,
with a notable connection to Windsor. (p. 5)
Thus presuming that there seems to be a “Canadian” approach, he refers to Leo Groarke’s
scholarship on visual argumentation, Michael Gilbert’s scholarship on multi-modal
argumentation, and Cristopher Tindale’s scholarship on rhetorical argumentation as collective
support for the existence of informal logics and “a more expansive view of argumentation.” (p.
10). In section six of his article, Puppo (2020) draws on Karl Jaspers’ work, which offers two
ways in which schools of thought develop:
One way is to imitate a master whose work we carry on by extension, adaptation, and
analogous achievement. The other way involves an unbroken intellectual tradition, within
which the student may be quite as independent as his teacher, since the tradition usually
does not center around a single personality but a group. (Jaspers 1948/1958, qtd in Puppo
2020, pp. 12-13)
Identifying with Jaspers’ second way, Puppo (2020) states that: a “Canadian school” of
argumentation “respects the same rule: people inspired by the same principle, working together
in an institute” (p. 13). Puppo’s position is clearly stated in the following paragraph:
(W)e can now give a positive answer to the question which began this essay: in our
opinion, and for the reasons we have already stated, one can speak of a ‘Canadian school
of argumentation’ because there exists, at the very least, a group of Canadian scholars who
practice a certain philosophical method [analytic philosophy]; share common goals (to
understand and teach argumentation); read and react to similar texts and ideas; carry out a
common process of preparation, teaching and learning of knowledge; work within shared
educational and scientific organizations; and are associated with common conferences and
research center. The Canadian ‘school’ inevitably deals with works and ideas that
constitute a large set of theories that, like the pieces of a mosaic, may not fit together
perfectly: but, as figurative arts and music teach us, a possible dissonance does not
diminish a fundamental harmony. Opinions we find expressed by people we can easily
recognize as part of that group demonstrate different perspectives on common themes, but
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in a way that reflects their dialogue with each other. These are, basically, opinions
expressed by people who work or have worked in the same place (in Windsor, in Ontario,
in Canada) and who, as we know, have in some cases become friends: everyone can
personally testify. And it is in this very quality that we find, perhaps, the most important
confirmation of the existence of a ‘school.’ (p. 16)
It is worth noting at this point that Puppo’s arguments in favor of the existence of a Canadian
school of argumentation depend on the acceptability of Jaspers’ conception of schools of thought.
Jumping from “is” to “ought” may be a common topic among philosophers, but his position can
be interpreted as an instance of pragmatic (consequential) argument. Using Jaspers’ second sense
of “school” could have positive consequences for the community of Canadian informal logicians
and argumentation scholars, a school brand that Dutch Pragma-Dialecticians have enjoyed but
the Canadians have not. The logical, dialectical, and rhetorical cogency of this pragmatic
definition and/or argument on “school of thought” deserves serious inquiry. However, the
auhor’s goal here is to think through the term “Canadian school” and examine the unbroken
intellectual tradition of Canadian and other informal logicians and argumentation scholars. His
lines of thought will focus on media or infrastructure of knowledge production and close
examination of historical records.
3. Public sphere as a framework for understanding the “Canadian” informal logic
movement
In his historico-sociological research, Jürgen Habermas has analyzed the bourgeois public
sphere, defining it as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion
can be formed” (Habermas 1974, p. 49). Three major principles of the literary public sphere—an
embryotic form of the bourgeois public sphere—are (1) to disregard status so that the force of
arguments determines the outcome of critical argumentation, (2) to allow participants to
problematize what has been unquestioned, and (3) to make the sphere inclusive2 (Habermas
1991, pp. 36-37). It is, of course, beyond the scope of this response to judge to what extent his
sense of public sphere is emperical. For the sake of argument, however, the author will extend
the concept to view how consistent the informal logic movement led by Johnson and Blair in the
1970s and 1980s looks, given the spirit and the principles of the public sphere: formation of
common or public opinions in a philosoher’s community regarding informal logic and
argumentation based on open exchange of arguments among participants about an unquestioned
presupposition. The process of examination here seems to lay some groundwork in addressing
the issue of the “Canadian” component of the Canadian-school-of-thought thesis Puppo has
advanced.
If we see scholarly activity as ongoing collective communication among participants, it
can be argued that the defining moment in the informal logic movement was the Windsor
Symposium on Informal Logic that Johnson and Blair held at the University of Windsor on June
26-28, 1978. Those attending included Michael Scriven, Howard Kahane, John Woods, Douglas
2

While Habermas (1991) emphasizes inclusiveness, he admits the public sphere is open to those who have property
and are educated. A fair amount of money was necessary to purchase books (commercial commodity) and a certain
level of literacy was required in order to read and discuss literary work. If we apply these conditions for inclusion in
the public sphere to informal logicians and argumentation scholars, we can say that argumentative literacy is
required for engaging in scholarship on argumentation.
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Walton, Trudy Govier, Robert Pinto, John McPeck, Robert Ennis, Deborah Orr. At a
symposium, Scriven (1980), “a founder of informal logic,” in Johnson and Blair’s (1994) view,
powerfully questioned the dominance of formal logic at the time; Woods’ (1980) questioned the
existence of informal logic; and Johnson and Blair (1980) described the state of the art of
informal logic and presented a list of problems and issues. Most participants were philosophers,
but some faculty members from different departments at the University of Windsor attended.
The Symposium was followed by the publication of a periodical medium; Blair and
Johnson started Informal Logic Newsletter in 1978, later stating that it was “designed to be an
informational organ for philosophers and others working in the field. Now in its second year, the
Newsletter has begun publication of short articles and critical reviews, and its expansion into a
journal seems imminent” (Blair and Johnson 1980, p. 161). As has been written elsewhere
(Konishi 2016b), the Newsletter took a theoretical turn, introducing scholarly debate on
induction and deduction, conductive argument and a priori analogy, and principles of charity,
just to name a few areas.
Another achievement of the 1978 Symposium was the publication of the proceedings in
1980 by Edgepress, a small publishing firm owned by Scriven.3 The publication helped informal
logic develop a presence, as evidenced by Habermas’ (1984, pp. 23-24) quotation of the
proceedings in his Theory of Communicative Action. The term “informal logic” and its approach
started to gain currency in the early 1980s.
Two more International Symposiums on Informal Logic, held in 1983 and 1989, the
creation of the peer-reviewed journal Informal Logic, the foundation of AILACT (the
Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) and another symposium proceedings,
published in 1994, collectively sustained the informal logic movement until OSSA took over
parts of the conference and proceedings. The “Canadian” approach to informal logic and
argumentation that Puppo endorses in his article, an analytic philosophizing of informal logic
and argumentation, came into being because of different Canadian media for argumentative
public spheres in which scholars could freely express their ideas on informal logic and
argumentation. The significance of these Canadian argumentative public spheres cannot be
overemphasized in terms of the development of informal logic and argumentation studies.
However, informal logicians and philosophers of argumentation in Canada and elsewhere
have not given sufficient credit to either this Canadian infrastructure of knowledge production or
the Canadian scholarly media/publications that served as vehicles for communication among
scholars. In the current author’s opinion, this is precisely because argumentation theorists tend to
talk about argumentation theories without recognizing what make those theorizing acts possible.
Blair’s article (2019) echoes the author’s opinion in that he recognized the value of the
infrastructure and media/publications:
Johnson and I did get support from our university as well as from a small conference
fund from the federal government administered by a national research-funding
council, but I assume that other countries had similar funding available….Canadians
got on board partly because of the Windsor conferences, and because the Informal
Logic journal cornered the philosophy side of the market as the journal of record for
3

In the first version of this article sent to the commentator, Puppo seems to be under the mistaken impression that
there were two symposiums on informal logic, one in 1978 and one in1980. In fact, the 1978 symposium was
Windsor Symposium on Informal Logic, and its proceedings was published by Edgepress in 1980, and the
symposium was re-named The First International Symposium on Informal Logic (FISIL).
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philosophically-oriented theorizing early on. Perhaps I am too close to see it, but I
must confess to an inability to recognize anything distinctively Canadian about our
contributions (Blair 2019, italics in original p. 59).
In the author’s view, although Blair seems to dismiss the notion of a distinctly Canadian
approach to informal logic and argumentation, the symposiums and Informal Logic did make
them possible. It is true that Michael Scriven was an established figure when Blair and Johnson
held FISIL in 1978 and financially supported the publication of the proceedings, so he can be
regarded as the founding father of informal logic. However, it was Blair and Johnson who
created and sustained Canadian argumentative public spheres for philosophizing informal logic
by convening three international symposiums, as well as publishing Informal Logic Newsletter,
Informal Logic and two symposium proceedings, furthering research in the field in the process.
The author regards Blair as overly humble in stating that there is nothing distinctively Canadian
about the contributions he and Johnson, Woods, Walton, Gilbert, and Hitchcock made.
There are two lines of support for the author’s contention that Canadian infrastructure
made the “Canadian” approach possible. Blair and Johnson (1980) write in the afterword of the
FISIL proceedings that “(f)or many of those who attended the Symposium itself, it served to
stimulate an active interest in the field of informal logic” (p. 161). One clear example of this is
Trudy Govier. In an oral history interview with the author, she (2007) talks about her memories
of FISIL.
(H)e [Michael Scriven] gave a very fiery sort of speech, in which he really claimed that
there was a cheat with formal logic, because it simply couldn’t handle all of these kinds of
arguments and it couldn’t really, couldn’t usefully describe them and couldn’t usefully be
used to teach people to handle them. I was very influenced by that speech. I thought there
was a whole research agenda here, because if people have this kind of logic, it doesn’t
handle these kinds of arguments. Then the question arises: “Well what does handle these
kinds of arguments?” And it just seemed to me to be a whole new territory. So I was very
influenced by that and that’s the thing that I remember the most of it.
Although Govier had reviewed the manuscript of Logical Self-Defense prior to FISIL, what
direction might her scholarly career have taken without FISIL? For that matter, where would the
community of informal logicians and philosophers of argumentation be now if there had been no
FISIL? It is an important “what-if” question, given that Govier’s (1987) Problems in Argument
Analysis strongly influenced Johnson’s Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument,
and that her textbook, A Practical Study of Argument can be seen as a clear instance of the
pluralistic theory of argument encapsulating deduction, induction, and a third class of arguments,
including conductive or a priori analogy.
Informal Logic Newsletter and Informal Logic constitute another line of support for my
contention that Canadian infrastructure enabled a “Canadian” approach to develop. Their
immediate influence may not be as easily recognizable as the face-to-face medium of the
symposium as instantiated by Scriven’s influence on Govier. However, these periodical media
sustained the scholarly discussion and communication on a regular basis, and Blair and Johnson
(1988) recognized their implications for the scholarly communities when they applied to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) in Canada for the grant to publish
Informal Logic in 1988.
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Informal Logic serves Canadian authors by providing a forum with an international
audience for their research; it serves Canadian Subscribers by putting on display the results
of the best research in the field both in and out of Canada….To both our contributors and
our readers it provides a sense of the field and the problem that face it.
In the same document, they (1988) refer to Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Douglas Walton,
John Woods, and Robert Binkley as scholars who have been published in the Newsletter or
Informal Logic and are involved in the editorial process. They also refer to Leo Groarke,
Christopher Tindale, Sharon Bailin, and James Gough as young scholars.
As Habermas’ sense of public sphere was limited to people with property and education,
Informal Logic also consciously took a position regarding its accessibility.
We avoid as much as possible publishing articles about logic which can be published in
other more appropriate journals, such as Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of
Symbolic Logic, Studia Logic, or Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. We have adopted a
liberal interpretation of what relates to informal logic, because the field is new and we have
been the only journal devoted especially to the publication of such research. (Blair and
Johnson 1988)
This passage reveals that, in the 1980s, Informal Logic tried to be as open as it could to informal
logicians and argumentation scholars, but it also tried to create a sphere separate from those of
other logic journals. While argumentation scholars need more careful historical research on the
substance of the articles published in Informal Logic to conclude whether the “Canadian”
approach to informal logic and argumentation is a distinct version of analytic philosophy, it can
be distinguished from other versions of analytic philosophy that other logic journals both
consciously and unconsciously endorse.
In summary, the author does not see evidence to suggest that the “Canadian” approach to
informal logic and argumentation is characterized by analytic philosophy. Further research is
needed to characterize the Canadian analytic philosophy developed in Informal Logic and/or
OSSA conferences. However, it seems clear that the Canadian public sphere or infrastructure
that Blair and Johnson created and sustained in the 1970s and 1980s enabled informal logicians
and philosophers of argumentation to develop the “Canadian” approach to argumentation.
4. What can an unbroken intellectual tradition of informal logicians be traced to?
In advancing a position that a “Canadian” informal logic and argumentation school of thought
exists, Puppo seems to be informed by Woods (2019), who states that “(t)he Canadian brand was
never as well-defined and organizationally and doctrinally sustained as the Amsterdam brand”
(p. 94).
As an alumnus of graduate programs in communication studies at Wayne State
University and the University of Pittsburgh (both in the United States) and in the philosophy
graduate program at the University of Windsor, the author wonders what is wrong with a nonexistence of school of thought among philosophers, or why must a school of thought exist among
philosophers, in the first place. Inquiries into argumentation theories and practices within
communication studies enjoy the diversity or suffer from the chaos of different approaches,
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depending on the viewpoint. Communication studies, as a field of inquiry, consists of humanities
and social sciences, with rhetoricians and rhetorical historians (Joseph Wenzel and David
Zarefsky), discourse analysists (Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson), social constructionism scholars
(Charles Willard), and public argument scholars (Thomas Goodnight and Gordon Mitchell)
seriously inquiring into argumentation theories and practices. It is doubtful that they buy into a
common doctrine. They may view argumentation from different ontological and epistemological
perspectives and treat different types of argument with different methodologies. PragmaDialectics is, arguably, an exceptional branch of argumentation studies whose substance has been
controlled for thirty years by van Eemeren and Grootendorst or van Eemeren and Houtlosser.
In maintaining Informal Logic as a forum for theorizing, Blair and Johnson consciously
decided not to create a “Canadian brand” like the Amsterdam brand of Pragma-Dialectics, so,
under their leadership, a Canadian school of argumentation has always been a non-starter. The
grant application document states that: “(w)e have tried to avoid imposing our personal
theoretical outlook upon it. However, by selections we make we encourage what seems to us
interesting new developments” (Blair and Johnson 1988). In the oral history interview of Blair in
Amsterdam at the ISSA Conference, Blair (2018) recalls how editors of Informal Logic operated:
We4 didn’t have any—any direction in mind at all. We weren’t—we weren’t leading the—
we weren’t sending a signal that this is what we wanted papers on….If…everybody was
writing about argument schemes, then we were getting lots of contributions on argument
schemes. If everyone was writing about deductive-inductive, we were…getting papers
about deductive-inductive and we were publishing those papers. So, we…followed the
interests of…the community rather than led by it. Now, of course…there’s likely to be…a
mutual interest. We had certain kinds of papers, we publish them, people read the journal,
they get interested in those topics, they start writing about them and they send us papers –
and so the papers that had earlier appeared in the journal…led to the papers that later
appeared in the journal. But it was not because we said, “We want papers on this topic.” It
was because that’s how the scholar—the interests of the contributors developed.
Based on their experience of communication studies of argumentation theories and practices, the
informal logic movement seems to have more in common with communication studies of
argumentation rather than with the Amsterdam school of Pragma-Dialectics. The records of the
editorship of Informal Logic also strongly imply that the two leaders of the informal logic
movement did not have the ambition to create an explicitly “Canadian school” of argumentation.
These written records and oral testimony serve as additional support for Puppo’s (2020)
conclusion that “a Canadian school of logic in the strong sense does not exist (p.94)5.
Setting aside the position that a “Canadian school exists” in a strong sense, the key
question is whether it exists in a different sense. Puppo (2020) cites Jaspers’ conception of
The pronoun “we” here probably includes Hans V. Hansen and Christopher Tindale as well as Blair and Johnson.
The editors of Informal Logic were Blair and Johnson between 1984 and 1999, Blair, Johnson, Hansen, and Tindale
between 2000 and 2016, and have been Blair and Tindale since then.
5
It is open to debate whether it is worth pursuing a “Canadian brand” in argumentation studies. When Johnson and
Blair (1994) lamented the lack of paradigm in informa logic at the Third International Symposium on Informal
Logic (TISIL) in 1989, Scriven pointed out that the notion of paradigm is a dubious construct in history and the
philosophy of science (Johnson and Blair 1994, p. 4, 15). The search for paradigm in informal logic, therefore, could
mean commitment to a dubious notion. In a similar vein, Puppo’s search for a “Canadian brand” based on Woods
could be problematic. The onus is Puppo and Woods to defend the value of the “Canadian brand.”
4
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schools of thought as an unbroken intellectual tradition to maintain his position on the “Canadian
school” of argumentation because:
there exists, at the very least, a group of Canadian scholars who practice a certain
philosophical method [analytic philosophy]; share common goals (to understand and teach
argumentation); read and react to similar texts and ideas; carry out a common process of
preparation, teaching and learning of knowledge; work within shared educational and
scientific organizations; and are associated with common conferences and research center.
(Puppo 2020, p. 16)
It is worth tracing whether “an unbroken intellectual tradition” exists among philosophers to
argue for the existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation. Puppo’s quotation above looks
fine on the surface. However, it makes us realize that we need closer examination of theoretical
scholarship to see if these conditions are met. Is it generally true that Canadian scholars use
analytic philosophy as a method? Do they read and discuss similar texts and ideas? What does it
mean that the process of preparation, teaching, and learning of knowledge is “common?” What
does it mean that people work within common educational and scientific organizations? How do
we judge whether people are associated with common conferences and/or a research center?
These are questions about, but not criticism on the above text. However, we should not
presuppose that these conditions are met because they constitute support for Puppo’s position.
Puppo (2000) draws on the work of three scholars in advancing an expansive view of
argumentation: Leo Groarke’s, Michael Gilbert’s, and Christopher Tindale’s (pp. 6-11).
Groarke’s scholarship on visual argumentation, to the best of my knowledge6, first appeared in
Argumentation and Advocacy in 1996—an important American medium for argumentation
studies; Gilbert’s (1997) conception of argument is heavily influenced by Charles Willard, an
American communication scholar, in developing multi-modal argumentation (p. 29); Tindale
(1999) draws on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (rhetoricians) as well as Sperber and Wilson
(communication scientists) in developing his version of rhetorical argumentation. Arguably,
these Canadian scholars’ research can be linked to argumentation studies traditions other than
Canadian ones, so the issue of inclusion in or exclusion from a Canadian school of
argumentation, if there is such a species, calls for more careful and thorough empirical
examination.
Turning our attention again to the Canadian media or infrastructure, the author draws on
an agenda published in 1980 in Informal Logic: The First International Symposium as part of the
proceedings. In the agenda, Johnson and Blair (1980) offered thirteen problems and issues
1. The theory of logical criticism
2. The theory of argument
3. The theory of fallacy
4. The fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach
6

Groarke also published an article on visual argumentation in Informal Logic in 1996. However, this joint issue was
published in 1997 or 1998, due to the perennial delay in publication of the journal (Blair and Johnson 1996). Which
article was first published is one issue, but the author would like to point out that an American journal
Argumentation and Advocacy was more open to publishing multiple papers on visual argumentation in the same
issue. This concerns whose infrastructure or which media for publications, those dedicated to American
communication studies or those dedicated to Canadian philosophy, can be linked to Groarkes’ scholarship and is
related to the “Canadian” component “Canadian-school-of-thought” thesis, as well.
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5. The viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
6. The ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
7. The problem of assumptions and missing premises
8. The problem of context
9. Methods of extracting arguments from context
10. Methods of displaying arguments
11. The problem of pedagogy
12. The nature, division and scope of informal logic
13. The relationship of informal logic to other inquiries (1980, pp. 25-26)
Groarke’s (1996) inquiry on visual argumentation is related to items 2, 9, 10, 11, and 12 and
possibly to item 7 on the agenda; Gilbert’s (1997) multi-modal argumentation is related to items
1, 2, 7, 9, and 10.; Tindale’s (1999) rhetorical argumentation is related to items 1, 2, and 13.
Turning our attention to other informal logicians, Walton has studied the nature of argument and
reasoning as well as fallacies (items 2 and 3); Hitchcock (1979, 1987) has inquired into
deduction and induction as standard for evaluating argument but not argument types (items 2 and
5) as well as enthymemes (item 7). Govier (1987) has examined conductive argument and a
priori analogy as a third class of argument (items 2 and 5), as well as fallacy theory and critical
thinking (items 3 and 4). Simply put, Blair and Johnson’s research agenda serves as a checklist
for us to examine an unbroken intellectual tradition of the informal logic movement.
The author does not imply that reference to Blair and Johnson’s agenda will decisively
establish a claim about the existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation. A careful textual
analysis is necessary to see whether a particular article actually embodies the above agenda item.
Also, the author understands that some informal logic scholarship, such as Woods and Walton’s
joint articles (2007) predates the 1978 FISIL, so an argument can be advanced that the impact of
the informal logic movement is not so significant. However, if we regard informal logic as a
philosophical community’s movement to establish a field of philosophical inquiry, the
infrastructure (including symposiums, conferences, books, and periodicals) and leadership
aspects are important because theorizing and philosophizing can be easily done within the
infrastructure prepared by leaders of the movement.
It may be necessary to trace principles or documents in order to justify the claim of an
unbroken intellectual tradition. It is the author’s contention that the research agenda by Blair and
Johnson (1980) is an important document revealing the beginning of the informal logic
movement and may help us understand how the “Canadian school” of argumentation has
developed within the Canadian infrastructure of argumentation.
5. Summation
Let me just lay out key points offered and developed in this response to further discussion on the
existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation.
Firstly, it is up to the cogency of pragmatic argument, based on Jasper’s conception of
school of thought as an unbroken intellectual tradition. Puppo may presume that we should use
Jasper’s conception because it helps us defend the thesis regarding the existence of the
“Canadian school” of argumentation.
Secondly, however, it may be the case that the Amsterdam brand of Pragma-Dialectics
may be an exceptional instance of a school of argumentation studies. American argumentation
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scholars in communication studies seem to live with a range of scholarly approaches that
represent diversity—perhaps even chaos. In addition, Blair and Johnson, two leaders of the
informal logic movement, did not seem to have the ambition to create a counterpart of PragmaDialectics.
Thirdly, instead of offering a doctrine that every informal logician must accept, Blair and
Johnson helped to set up Canadian infrastructure or public sphere for informal logicians and
argumentation scholars including international symposiums and their proceedings, a newsletter, a
journal, and a professional organization. The Canadian infrastructure collectively served as a
media for exchanging scholarly ideas. More empirical inquiry about the existence of a
distinctively Canadian informal logic and argumentation can be done, but it seems clear that the
Canadian infrastructure helped scholarship to develop in the 1970s and 1980s.
Fourthly, Johnson and Blair’s research agenda (1980) can be seen as a catalyst
promoting the scholarship of a “Canadian school” of argumentation in the sense Puppo’s adheres
to. Since the agenda was published within the Canadian infrastructure of the informal logic
movement, it can be argued that, in a weak sense, a school has existed because of the Canadian
infrastructure.
These four points collectively add additional layers to the research that Puppo has started.
On the one hand they remind argumentation scholars of the importance of the infrastructure of
knowledge production. As theorists and practitioners of informal logic and argumentation,
philosophers tend to praise, admire, agree, disagree, or ignore ideas developed at conferences
and journals. However, they do not fully understand significance of the media and infrastructure
that enable them to promote the exchange of ideas and maintain intellectual tradition
On the other hand, Puppo’s research has prepared a new path to further historical
research on argumentation studies. How have philosophers of argumentation interacted with each
other to develop a school in a weak sense? How can we situate a particular philosopher’s
research in the tradition of argumentation scholarship? The author agrees with Puppo that the
history of philosophy tells argumentation scholars something important about history and theory
of argumentation. However, scholars need to be more careful about carrying out historical
research. Philosophers of argument must avoid jumping to conclusions with limited historical
evidence. To make the case for an unbroken intellectual tradition, we have to see how people
interact in developing philosophizing and theorizing the field of informal logic and
argumentation. As the present author (2009) has stated elsewhere, we have to be careful about
how the history and the theory of informal logic and argumentation interact with each other (p.
22).
If the author answers his own call for care in jumping to a conclusion with limited
evidence, one weakness of the present response must be pointed out. While Puppo draws heavily
on scholarship developed in the 1990s, this response draws more on scholarship done in the
1970s and 1980s. Blair and Johnson were productive throughout these periods, and it can be
argued that their leadership role gradually decreased over the years because Hansen and Tindale
took care of more than ten OSSA conferences and were also partially resposible for Informal
Logic together with Blair and Johnson. More archival research in the 1990s and later might
change the picture of history of Canadian infrastructure as well as a “Canadian school” of
argumentation.
With that said, the the author would like to take this opportunity to thank Blair, Johnson,
Hansen, Tindale, Hundleby Parr, Guarini, and the late Pinto for their efforts with regard to the
sustainable development of informal logic and argumentation in Canada. The author would like
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to thank Hansen and Blair, in particular, for sacrificing part of their own scholarship for the
benefict of the community of informal logicians and philosophers of argument.
Acknowledgements: J Anthony Blair and Trudy Govier spared their time for oral history
interviews. Peter J. Collins did excellent work transcribing and editing and proofreading of the
initial draft of this response. Hans V. Hansen and Federico Puppo patiently waited for my
comments. I truly appreciate all of these people for their time, support, and understanding.
References
Blair, J. A. (2018). Interviewed by Takuzo Konishi, at University of Amsterdam, July 5.
–––. (2019). Pioneering informal logic and argumentation studies. In: F. Puppo (Ed.), Informal
Logic: A ‘Canadian’ Approach to Argument (pp. 35-60, Ch. 1), Windsor, ON: Windsor
Studies in Argumentation.

Blair, J. A. and R. H. Johnson (Eds.). (1980). Informal Logic: The First International
Symposium. Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress.
–––. (1988, March 30). Program to aid to learned journals (Application for a grand for the
journal Informal Logic, sent to Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada).
–––. (1996). From the Editors. Informal Logic 18. 2 & 3.

Gilbert, M. (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence.
Govier, T. (1985). A Practical Study of Argument. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
–––. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris.
–––. (2007). Interviewed by Takuzo Konishi, at the University of Windsor, June 8.

Groarke, L. (1996). Logic, art and argument. Informal Logic18. 2 & 3, 105-129.
Habermas, J. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article (1964). (S. Lennox & F.
Lennox, Trans.). New German Critique, 3, pp. 49-55.
–––. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society
(Vol. 1). (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
–––. (1991). Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society. (T. Burger with the assistance of F. Lawrence, Trans.). MIT Press.
(Original work published in 1962).

11

Johnson, R. H. and J. A. Blair. (1980). Recent development of informal logic. In: J. A. Blair and
R. H. Johnson (Eds.), Informal logic: The first international symposium (pp. 3-28, Ch. 1),
Pt Reyes, CA: Edgepress.
–––. (Eds.). (1994). New Essays in Informal Logic. Windsor, ON. Informal Logic.
–––. (1994). Informal logic: past and present. In R. H. Johnson and J. A. Blair (Eds.), New
Essays in Informal Logic (pp. 1-19, Ch. 1). Windsor, ON. Informal Logic.

Hitchcock, D. (1979). Deductive and inductive: Types of validity, not types of argument.
Informal Logic Newsletter. 2 (3), 9-10.
–––. (1987). Enthymematic Arguments. In: F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, &
C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline (pp. 289-298).
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris.

Konishi, T. (2009). Toward a history of argumentation: Canadian informal logic. In: J. Ritola
(Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-26), Windsor, ON:
OSSA.
–––. (2011). Logically defending for publication: An analysis of the review process of Logical
Self-Defense. In: F. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, and G. Mitchell (Eds.),
Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Argumentation (pp. 998-1009,
Ch. 92), Amsterdam: SicSat.
–––. (2016a). Where practical activity meets theoretical excitement: A rhetorical history of Trudy
Govier’s contribution to the informal logic movement. In: Catherine Hundleby (Ed.),
Reasonable Responses: Essays in Honor of Trudy Govier. Windsor, ON: University of
Windsor Press.
–––. (2016b). When different perspectives interact: A historical account of informal logic
between 1983 and 1987. In L. Benacquista & P. Bondy (Eds.), Proceedings of the
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation Conference, Vol. 11 (pp. 1-20), Windsor,
ON: OSSA.
–––. (2019). Informal logic and the First International Conference on Argumentation. In: B.
Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell, and J. H. M. Wagemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the
Nineth International Conference on Argumentation (pp. 675-685), Amsterdam: SicSat.

Puppo. F. (2020, June 3). “Harmony in diversity. On the (possible) existence of ‘the Canadian
school of argumentation.’” OSSA 12
Scriven, M. (1980). The philosophical and pragmatic significance of informal logic. In R. H.
Johnson and J. A. Blair (Eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium. (pp.
147-160, Ch. 9), Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress.

12

Tindale. C. W. (1999). Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument. Albany, NY: SUNY.
Woods, J. (1980). What is informal logic? In: R. H. Johnson and J. A. Blair (Eds.), Informal
Logic: The First International Symposium. (pp. 57-68, Ch. 4), Pt. Reyes, CA: Edgepress.
–––. (2019). Formal models. In: F. Puppo (Ed.), Informal Logic: A ‘Canadian’ Approach to
Argument (pp. 61-103), Windsor, ON: Windsor Studies in Argumentation.

Woods, J. & Walton, D. (2007). Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972-1982. London: College
Publications

13

